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MUNICIPAL LAW²MUNICIPAL POLICE POWER & ITS ADVERSE EFFECTS
ON SMALL BUSINESSES IN ARKANSAS: A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM

I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine that after many years of hard work, you have established a relatively successful small business within your community. You have regular
clientele and consistently provide them with quality goods. In addition, you
have always operated your business in compliance with federal, state, and
local regulations. Recently, the city in which your business is located enacted a series of ordinances as part of an effort to enhance its aesthetic qualities. The first such ordinance restricted the height of commercial signs and
required business owners to remove all non-conforming signs from their
premises at their own expense. Although this ordinance required you to remove the prominent metal sign from your property, you were not too disPD\HGE\WKHFLW\¶VDFWLRQEHFDXVH\RXZHUHDEOHWRSODFHVPDOOHUWHPSorary signs in strategic locations throughout the premises. Shortly thereafter,
KRZHYHU D VLPLODU RUGLQDQFH ZDV HQDFWHG WKDW UHVWULFWHG EXVLQHVV RZQHUV¶
display of temporary signs to two nonconsecutive thirty-day periods per
year. Aside from ruining your advertising plans, this ordinance also rendered useless the long-term contract you had recently entered into with a
commercial sign supplier.
7RPDNHPDWWHUVZRUVHWKHFLW\¶VQHZHVWRUGLQDQFHWKUHDWHQVWRDIIHFW
your business more severely than either of the other ordinances passed thus
far. Aimed at protecting the pavement of the most commonly used streets in
the city from further damage, this ordinance prohibits businesses from operating trucks larger than a half-ton on the streets. Because your business is
located near an affected road and regularly receives shipments of goods
from a wholesale supplier, at the very least you will have to pay extra fuel
costs for its trucks to use a series of back roads to reach your business. More
likely, your supplier will decide to terminate its relationship with you and
supply a business located near the unaffected streets. Thus, with your manner of advertising restricted and your relationship with your supplier jeopardized, you fear you will soon lose a significant amount of customers. For
these reasons, you retain the services of a local attorney in an effort to challenge these new ordinances.
You file a complaint against the city in court, arguing that the ordinances were enacted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, and as such,
violate your due process rights under the state and federal constitutions. In
the alternative, you argue that the ordinances must be struck down for
vagueness. However, you are dismayed to learn that the court has upheld the
177
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FLW\¶VDFWLRQVKROGLQJWKDWWKHFLW\³DFWHGFOHDUO\ZLWKLQLWVSROLFHSRZHU
in the LQWHUHVWRIWKHSXEOLFKHDOWKDQGVDIHW\RILWVLQKDELWDQWV´1 Thus, not
only do you face losing a substantial source of income, but the city has no
obligation to compensate you for any losses you incur.
Arkansas case law is replete with scenarios similar to the one described
above.2 Under Ark. Code Ann. § 14-55-102³0XQLFLSDOFRUSRUDWLRQVVKDOO
have [the] power to make and publish bylaws and ordinances . . . to provide
for the safety, preserve the health, promote the prosperity, and improve the
morals, oUGHUFRPIRUWDQGFRQYHQLHQFHRI>WKHLU@LQKDELWDQWV´3 The
Arkansas Supreme Court has interpreted this statutory grant of power to
mean that a municipality may regulate a lawful business in the interests of
public health, safety, and welfare.4 As long as the municipality has a reasonable basis for the exercise of this power, a court will uphold the action, regardless of its adverse effect on a business.5 Because this power is considered a police power, a municipality is not required to compensate a small
business owner for any losses the business incurs by complying with the
ordinance.6
This note concerns the power of Arkansas municipalities to regulate
small businesses in the interests of public health, safety, and welfare. Because this power is vague, subjects small businesses to unequal treatment,
and can cause severe economic consequences for small businesses, this note
will argue that Arkansas courts should adopt a measure that offers greater
protection to adversely affected small business owners.7
This issue is relevant to advocates for small businesses because the
level of deference Arkansas courts currently grant to municipal police power
is extremely high.8 Yet, owing to its inherent flexibility, the scope of municipal police power is often unclear.9 As a result, small business owners are
RIWHQ XQSUHSDUHG IRU D QHZO\ HQDFWHG RUGLQDQFH¶V DGYHUVH HIIHFWV RQ WKHLU
1. 6SULQJILHOG Y &LW\ RI /LWWOH 5RFN  $UN  í  6:G  
(1956).
2. The above ordinances are based on actual ordinances described in City of Fayetteville v. S & H, Inc., 261 Ark. 148, 547 S.W.2d 94 (1977); City of Hot Springs v. Carter, 310
Ark. 405, 836 S.W.2d 863 (1992); and House v. City of Texarkana, 225 Ark. 162, 279
S.W.2d 831 (1955) respectively. These cases will be discussed in further detail infra.
3. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-55-102 (Repl. 1998).
4. See Phillips v. Town of Oak Grove 333 Ark. 183, 191±6:Gí
(1998).
5. See id. at 193, 968 S.W.2d at 605.
6. See EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24:6 (3d ed.
2013).
7. See infra Part IV.
8. See Phillips, 333 Ark. at 197, 968 S.W.2d at 607.
9. See City of Fayetteville v. S & H, Inc., 261 Ark. 148, 158, 547 S.W.2d 94, 99 (1977)
(Fogleman, J., dissenting).
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businesses.10 Moreover, because Arkansas courts almost always uphold a
PXQLFLSDOLW\¶VH[HUFLVHRILWVSROLFHSRZHUVVPDOOEXVLQHss owners currently
receive little relief from burdensome ordinances.11 Although the Arkansas
Legislature has recently tried to remedy this situation, the method proposed
by the Legislature was unsatisfactory, and ultimately failed to be enacted
into law.12
The first section of this note will discuss the legal basis for municipal
police power in Arkansas.13 This section will then examine the scope of municipal police power in Arkansas, focusing primarily on its use through land
use devices such as ordinances.14 Cases decided throughout the twentieth
century established that municipal police power in Arkansas has a very wide
scope.15 Nevertheless, several instances exist where the use of municipal
police power is either severely restricted or invalid altogether.16
The second section of this note will identify problems that can result
when municipal police power is used to regulate small businesses.17 Because
H[WUHPHO\YDJXHODQJXDJHFDQIUXVWUDWHDVPDOOEXVLQHVVRZQHU¶VDWWHPSWWR
comply with newly enacted regulations, this section will also explore the
extremely vague language used in ordinances.18 It will also analyze ordinances that subject small businesses to unequal treatment.19 Finally, this
section will focus on how small business owners can face economic consequences as a direct result of a newly enacted ordinance.20
The final section of this note will consider the value of various judicial
and legislative remedies.21 This section will conclude by acknowledging that
although municipal police power is important for the vitality of a community, courts in Arkansas should consider adopting an approach that regards
10. See Op. Ark. Att¶y. Gen. No. 129 (2005).
11. See Phillips, 333 Ark. at 193, 968 S.W.2d at 605.
12. See infra at Part IV.C.
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. See infra Part II.B.
15. See Pierce Oil Corporation v. City of Hope, 248 U.S. 498 (1919); Phillips v. Town
of Oak Grove, 333 Ark. 183, 188, 968 S.W.2d 600, 602 (1998); City of Hot Springs v.
Carter, 310 Ark. 405, 836 S.W.2d 863 (1992); Hatfield v. City of Fayetteville, 278 Ark. 544,
647 S.W.2d 450 (1983); City of Fayetteville v. McIlroy Bank & Trust Company, 278 Ark.
500, 647 S.W.2d 439 (1983); City of Fayetteville v. S & H, Inc., 261 Ark. 148, 155, 547
6:G  +RXVHY&LW\RI7H[DUNDQD$UNí6:G
í  *ROGPDQ &RY&LW\RI1/LWWOH5RFN$UNí6:G
 í   5HLQPDQ Y &LW\ RI /LWWle Rock, 107 Ark. 174, 155 S.W. 105 (1913)
aff¶d86í  
16. See infra Part II.B.3.
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part III.A.
19. See infra Part III.B.
20. See infra Part III.C.
21. See infra Part IV.
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small business owners as a protected class in need of special judicial protection from burdensome ordinances.22
II.

BACKGROUND

A. Legal Basis for Municipal Police Power in Arkansas
Municipalities in Arkansas derive their police powers from a statutory
grant of power,23 which is consistent with a majority of states.24 The SuSUHPH&RXUWRI$UNDQVDVKDVUHIHUUHGWRWKLVSRZHUDVD³plenary duty . . .
[to be exercised] in the interest[s] of the public health and safety of its inKDELWDQWV´25 Although this power is regarded as a duty, municipalities are
granted broad discretion to determine both whether a need exists for its exercise and how it should be exercised to benefit the public health, safety, and
welfare.26 One way a municipality may exercise its police power to meet
these needs is by enacting ordinances.27 This manifestation of municipal
police power will be the primary focus of this note.
Courts in Arkansas gHQHUDOO\XSKROGDPXQLFLSDOLW\¶VH[HUFLVHRISROLFH
power, unless it has been preempted by28 or conflicts with state or federal
law.29 When municipal police power is validly exercised, courts in Arkansas
KDYHVWDWHGWKDW³SULYDWHULJKWVPXVW\LHOGWR>WKH@Vecurity [of public health,
SXEOLF VDIHW\ DQG SXEOLF FRPIRUW@´30 Accordingly, a municipality is under
no obligation to compensate a landowner who is adversely affected by municipal police power.31 Furthermore, no taking under the Fifth or Fourteenth

22. See infra Part IV.D.
23. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-55-102 ( Repl. 1998).
24. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, § 24:36 (³There is no inherent police power in municipal corporations . . . delegation by the state is requisite to the existence of police power in
any municipal corporation.´).
25. Phillips v. Town of Oak Grove, 333 Ark. 183, 189, 968 S.W.2d 600, 603 (1998)
(emphasis added). It is worth noting that plenary is defined as ³Full; complete; entire.´
BLACK¶S LAW DICTIONARY 1273 (9th ed. 2009). The justice¶s deliberate choice of this word
in the opinion reflects the broad scope of municipal police power in Arkansas.
26. See Springfield v. City of Little Rock, 226 Ark. 462, 465, 290 S.W.2d 620, 622
(1956).
27. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, § 24:49 (describing ordinances as ³legislative enactments of a municipality to exercise the police power vested in it by the constitution, statutes,
or its charter.´).
28. See Op. Ark. Att¶y. Gen. No. 302 (1995).
29. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, § 24:9.
30. Beaty v. Humphrey, 195 Ark. 1008, 1008, 115 S.W.2d 559, 561 (1938).
31. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, § 32:30 (³[U]nder a reasonable and proper exercise of
the police power . . . rights in the property may be restricted, impaired or even eliminated
without compensation to the owners.´).

2014]

MUNICIPAL LAW

181

Amendments occur when municipal police power is exercised legitimately
for the public health, safety, and welfare.32
B. Scope of Municipal Police Power in Arkansas
As discussed above, municipalities in Arkansas have very broad discretion to use their police powers. A municipality is free to use its police powers to regulate a business activity, as long as it determines that the activity
has somehow violated the public welfare, health, or safety.33 Given the high
level of deference afforded to municipal police power in Arkansas, however,
a question naturally arises: how do courts in Arkansas determine whether a
business activity has violated the public welfare, health, or safety?
1.

Public Health and Safety

Early cases tended to focus on the public health and safety elements of
PXQLFLSDO SROLFH SRZHU 'XULQJ WKH V WZR FDVHV FRQFHUQLQJ D FLW\¶V
SRZHUWRFXUEDEXVLQHVV¶VQXLVDQFH-like activity were presented before the
Supreme Court of the United States.34 In Reinman v. City of Little Rock,35
Little Rock enacted an ordinance prohibiting livery stables within certain
DUHDVRIWKHFLW\EHFDXVHLWKDGGHWHUPLQHGWKDWWKHEXVLQHVVHVZHUH³GHWUimental to the health, interest, and prosperity of the cit\´RQDFFRXQWRIWKHLU
³RIIHQVLYHRGRUVDQG>FRQWULEXWLRQWR@GLVHDVH´36 The Supreme Court of
WKH8QLWHG6WDWHVXSKHOGWKHFLW\¶VRUGLQDQFHDVDYDOLGH[HUFLVHRIPXQLFipal police power.37 For similar reasons, in Pierce Oil Corporation v. City of
Hope,38 WKH6XSUHPH&RXUWXSKHOGDQRUGLQDQFHSURKLELWLQJWKH³VWRULQJRI
SHWUROHXP JDVROLQH >HWF@ ZLWKLQ WKUHH KXQGUHG IHHW RI DQ\ GZHOOLQJ´39
Subsequent cases²which did not reach the Supreme Court of the United
States²held that junkyards,40 waste paper and rag storage,41 heavy trucks,42
32. Id. (³[C]onstitutional provision that private property shall not be taken for public use
without compensation is not applicable´ to valid exercises of police power.).
33. See Springfield v. City of Little Rock, 226 Ark. 462, 465, 290 S.W.2d 620, 622
(1956).
34. See Robert R. Wright, ZONING LAW IN ARKANSAS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, 3 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 421 (1980).
35. 237 U.S. 171 (1915).
36. Id. DWí
37. Id. DWí
38. 248 U.S. 498 (1919).
39. Id. at 499.
40. See *ROGPDQ &RY&LW\RI1/LWWOH5RFN$UNí6:G
í   XSKROGLQJDQRUGLQance that prohibited junkyards and waste paper and
rag storage because the city had determined that these business activities were ³fire and
health hazards and detrimental to the public welfare´).
41. See id.
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flashing signs,43 and small-scale commercial fowl operations44 could be regulated under municipal police power, regardless of any detrimental effects to
local businesses.
2.

Public Welfare

Several cases decided during the latter-half of the twentieth century
clarified the scope of municipal police power by focusing on its public welfare element. In his dissent to City of Fayetteville v. S & H, Incorporated,45
Justice Fogelman argued in support of an ordinance providing for the seven
year amortization of business signs that failed to conform to height, size,
and setback requirements even though the city had determined that the nonconforming signs posed a threat to its scenic resources rather than public
health and safety.46 He stated that the Arkansas Supreme Court had interSUHWHGWKHWHUPSXEOLFZHOIDUHWRLQFOXGH³SXEOLFFRQYHQLHQFHDQGFRPIRUW
DQGJHQHUDOSURVSHULW\´47 Accordingly, because the term encompassed such
DEURDGFRQFHSW-XVWLFH)RJHOPDQDUJXHGWKDW³>W@KHIDFWWKDWaesthetic considerations were a significant factor in the exercise of the police power
VKRXOG QRW LQYDOLGDWH DQ RUGLQDQFH´48 Although these viewpoints first surfaced in a dissenting opinion, the majority adopted them when it considered
the same ordinance six years later in City of Fayetteville v. McIlroy Bank &
Trust Company.49 There, the court, acknowledging the trend in other jurisGLFWLRQVVWDWHGWKDWPXQLFLSDOLWLHVFRXOGXVHWKHLUSROLFHSRZHU³WRPDNHWKH
surroundings in which they live and work more beautiful or more attractive
RUPRUHFKDUPLQJ´50 Following this decision, the court has regularly upheld

42. See House v. City of Texarkana, 225 Ark. 16 í 6:G í
(1955) (upholding an ordinance that prohibited the use of ³any motor truck, truck-tractor with
semi-trailer or any full trailer´ on certain streets because city had determined that the ordinance was ³necessary to protect the pavement upon said streets, and for the immediate
preservation of the public health, peace and safety.´).
43. See City of Fayetteville v. S & H, Inc., 261 Ark. 148, 155, 547 S.W.2d 94, 98 (1977)
(upholding an ordinance that prohibited blinking signs because it could affect the public
health and safety).
44. See Phillips v. Town of Oak Grove, 333 Ark. 183, 188, 968 S.W.2d 600, 602 (1998)
(upholding ordinance that prohibited commercial fowl operations because town was concerned about the ³deleterious effects of commercial broiler activities´ on the public health).
45. 261 Ark. 148, 156±71, 547 S.W.2d 94, 98±107 (1977) (Fogelman, J., dissenting).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 158 n.1, 547 S.W.2d at 100 n.1 (citing Beaty v. Humphrey, 195 Ark. 1008, 115
S.W.2d 559 (1938)).
48. Id. at 165, 547 S.W.2d at 102.
49. 278 Ark. 500, 647 S.W.2d 439 (1983).
50. Id. at 502±03, 647 S.W.2d at 440; see also Buckley W. Bridges, 2010: A Second
Odyssey into Arkansas Land-Use Law, 33 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 9, 10±13 (2010)
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D PXQLFLSDOLW\¶V UHJXODWLRQ RI EXVLQHVV VLJQV LQ WKH LQWHUHVW RI SXEOLF ZHlfare.51 It remains to be seen whether the court will permit ordinances to
regulate other business activities under this expanded notion of the public
welfare.
3.

Limits

Although municipalities in Arkansas have broad discretion to regulate
business activities under their police powers, this power is not without its
limits. Several instances exist where the use of municipal police power to
regulate a business is either severely restricted or invalid altogether. One
such instance occurs when the Arkansas legislature has expressed its intent
to regulate an area.52 The mere presence of a state law governing a similar
area as an ordinance does not necessarily indicate preemption, however.53
5DWKHUSUHHPSWLRQRFFXUVZKHQWKH6WDWH³UHJXODW>HV@an area completely so
DV QRW WR OHDYH UHDVRQDEOH URRP IRU ORFDO UHJXODWLRQ´54 When this has occurred, a municipality may be entirely preempted from exercising its police
powers in that area,55 or may have to tailor its power to comply with the
VWDWH¶V JXLGHOLQHV56 $ VLPLODU LQVWDQFH RFFXUV ZKHQ D PXQLFLSDOLW\¶V H[Hrcise of its police power actually conflicts with a state statute.57 Finally, ArNDQVDVFRXUWVLQWKHSDVWKDGLQYDOLGDWHGDPXQLFLSDOLW\¶VXVHRISROLFHSRwHUWRUHJXODWHDEXVLQHVVZKHQLWH[FHHGHGWKHPXQLFLSDOLW\¶VVWDWXWRU\JUDQW
of power.58 These decisions, however, were premised on a legal theory that
is no longer followed in Arkansas.59 Thus, with this manner of challenging a

(discussing the two cases and their influence on aesthetics as a valid form of land use regulation in Arkansas).
51. See, e.g., City of Hot Springs v. Carter, 310 Ark. 405, 836 S.W.2d 863 (1992); Hatfield v. City of Fayetteville, 278 Ark. 544, 647 S.W.2d 450 (1983).
52. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-43-601 (Repl. 2013) (containing list of ³state affairs´).
53. See Op. Ark. Atty. Gen. No. 2005-129 (2005).
54. Id.
55. See Op. Ark. Atty. Gen. No. 302 (1995).
56. See id. (explaining that a municipality may enact ordinances in an area regulated by
the State as long as they do not contradict existing state law).
57. See ARK. CONST. art. XII, § 4 (³No municipal corporation shall be authorized to pass
any laws contrary to the general laws of the state.´).
58. See Town of Dyess v. Williams, 247 Ark. 155, 444 S.W.2d 701 (1969) (holding that
use of municipal police power to require all local businesses to close down from midnight
until 4:00 am exceeded municipality¶s statutory grant of power); City of Morrilton v. Malco
Theatres, 202 Ark. 101, 149 S.W.2d 55 (1941) (holding that use of municipal police power to
prohibit local movie theaters from showing more than one film exceeded municipality¶s
statutory grant of power); Balesh v. City of Hot Springs, 173 Ark. 661, 293 S.W. 14 (1927)
(holding that use of municipal police power to prohibit the sale of goods by auction exceeded
municipality¶s statutory grant of power).
59. See Tompos v. City of Fayetteville, 280 Ark. 435, 438, 658 S.W.2d 404, 406 (1983).
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PXQLFLSDOLW\¶VXVHRISROLFHSRZHUDEURJDWHGOHJDOFKDOOHQJHVWRPXQLFLSDO
police power have become even more difficult in recent years.
$PXQLFLSDOLW\¶VXVHRILWVSRlice power to regulate a business activity
is frequently challenged under the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions. For instance, municipal police power that is exercised in
an arbitrary and capricious manner violates the substantive due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.60 If a
municipality enacts an ordinance that lacks a reasonable relation to public
health, safety, and welfare, then the municipality has acted arbitrarily and
capriciously, and the ordinance is invalid as a matter of law.61 Courts, however, use the rational-basis standard of review when considering these cases,
holding that the municipality is in a better position to identify the factors
necessitating the ordinance.62 As a result, courts in Arkansas almost always
ILQG WKDW D PXQLFLSDOLW\¶V H[HUFLVH RI LWV SROLFH SRZHUV EHDUV D UHDVRQDEOH
relation to public health, safety, and welfare.63 $PXQLFLSDOLW\¶VH[HUFLVHRI
its police power may also face a due process challenge when the ordinance
regulating the business activity is written in vague language. 64 Yet, a challenger making this argument faces a daunting burden: A plaintiff must
GHPRQVWUDWHWKDWWKH³FKDOOHQJHGODQJXDJHLVYDJXHLQDOORILWVDSSOLFDWLRQV
such that it could never EH DSSOLHG LQ D YDOLG PDQQHU´65 The difficulty of
such a demonstration will be explained in an upcoming section of this
note.66
Thus, although municipalities are limited in their use of police power to
regulate businesses, the power is still extremely broad. Absent a showing
WKDWWKHPXQLFLSDOLW\¶VXVHRISROLFHSRZHUZDVSUH-empted by or conflicts
with state or federal law, an ordinance that regulates a business activity is
highly unlikely to be overturned in an Arkansas court.

60. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, § 24:9.
61. See, e.g., McClendon v. City of Hope, 217 Ark. 367, 230 S.W.2d 57 (1950) (ordinance requiring excessive inspection of milk imported from outside of Hope found to be
arbitrary and unreasonable as applied to plaintiff because plaintiff produced milk under the
same standards required by the ordinance).
62. See Johnson v. Sunray Servs., Inc., 306 Ark. 497, 505, 816 S.W.2d 582, 587 (1991)
(³We have long subscribed to a lenient rational basis test in Arkansas´ in determining whether an ordinance is reasonably related to the public health, safety, and welfare.).
63. See Phillips v. Town of Oak Grove, 333 Ark. 183, 193, 968 S.W.2d 600, 605 (1998).
64. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, § 15:22.
65. Craft v. City of Ft. Smith, 335 Ark. 417, 425, 984 S.W.2d 22, 26 (1998).
66. See infra Part III.A.
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MUNICIPAL POLICE POWERS¶ ADVERSE EFFECTS ON SMALL
BUSINESSES

Municipal police power in Arkansas can have far-reaching effects on
local businesses by regulating a broad variety of business activities. Furthermore, because municipal police power is exercised for the benefit of the
public, a private individual cannot expect to be compensated for any detrimental effects he or she personally experiences.67 Although larger businesses are often able to shoulder burdensome regulations more effectively, a
small business is less likely to be able to do so; it may lack the financial
resources to comply with the newly enacted ordinance, or it may lose a significant portion of its business by virtue of the ordinance.68 This section will
explore the various ways in which municipal police power can adversely
affect a small business in Arkansas.
$0XQLFLSDO3ROLFH3RZHU¶V9DJXHQHss Leaves Small Business Owners
Unprepared
Municipal police power is flexible by its nature.69 Courts in Arkansas
KDYH UHFRJQL]HG WKLV DVSHFW RI PXQLFLSDO SROLFH SRZHU VWDWLQJ WKDW LW ³LV
admittedly incapable of precise definition and its lines of delimitation are
QRWFOHDUO\PDUNHG´70 Although this flexibility is necessary for communities
to deal rapidly with changing conditions, it presents a challenge for small
businesses: small business owners may not know in advance that their business activities pose a threat to the public health, safety, and welfare. Consequently, when an ordinance is enacted that regulates an activity specific to
their business, they are unprepared for any of its detrimental effects on their
business. Furthermore, it may be unclear whether an ordinance regulating a
business activity has actually been preempted by or conflicts with state or
federal law. For example, in an Arkansas Attorney General Opinion, a constituent who questioned the validity of an ordinance regulating smoking in
UHVWDXUDQWVZDVLQIRUPHGWKDWUHVROXWLRQRIWKHLVVXH³PD\XOWLPDWHO\UHTXLUH
resort to the courts, as the legislature has not clearly expressed its intent with
UHVSHFWWRWKHH[HUFLVHRIPXQLFLSDOOHJLVODWLYHDXWKRULW\LQWKLVDUHD´71 For
67. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, § 24:6.
68. See Op. Ark. Att¶y. Gen. No. 129 (2005).
69. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, § 24:8 (Police power ³is not . . . [limited by] precedents based on conditions of a past era . . . it is sufficiently flexible to meet changing conditions that call for revised or new regulations to promote the public health, safety, morals, or
welfare.´).
70. City of Fayetteville v. S & H, Inc., 261 Ark. 148, 158, 547 S.W.2d 94, 99 (1977)
(Fogelman, J., dissenting).
71. Op. Ark. Atty. Gen. No. 95-302 (1995).
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small business owners facing a similar situation, this may not be an option,
as resorting to the courtroom to determine the validity of an ordinance
would cause them to incur considerable expenses.
In addition to the flexible nature of municipal police power, ordinances
regulating business activities are often written in vague or unclear language,
making it difficult for small businesses to comply with their terms. For instance, an ordinance enacted by the city of North Little Rock prohibited the
VWRUDJH RI FRPEXVWLEOH PDWWHU ³in such a manner as to endanger from fire
any building or structure within the city limLWV´72 Although the ordinance
did not specify the acts that would violate this phrase, the court upheld the
ordinance as a valid exercise of municipal police power.73 Thus, as this case
demonstrates, courts in Arkansas apply a heavy burden for pre-enforcement
challenges to ordinances that regulate business activity, regardless of the
FODULW\RIWKHRUGLQDQFH¶VODQJXDJH74 A plaintiff must demonstrate that the
³FKDOOHQJHG ODQJXDJH LV YDJXH LQ DOO RI LWV DSSOLFDWLRQV VXFK WKDW LW FRXOG
never be applied in a valLG PDQQHU´75 Because this burden of proof is so
high, a small business is unlikely to prevail against a burdensome ordinance
E\DUJXLQJWKDWWKHRUGLQDQFH¶VYDJXHODQJXDJHPDGHLWGLIILFXOWWRFRPSO\
with the terms.
B. Municipal Police Power Subjects Small Businesses to Unequal Treatment
Small businesses in Arkansas may face unequal treatment when municipal police power is used to classify them in a manner that causes them to be
treated inequitably. Under its police powers, a municipality in Arkansas may
enact such ordinances as long as there is a rational basis for the distinction.76
7KLVGLVWLQFWLRQPD\EHEDVHGVROHO\RQWKHDFWLYLW\¶VFRPPHUFLDOTXDOLWLHV
regardless of whether the activity is substantially similar to an unregulated
recreational activity. For instance, an ordinance may entirely prohibit smallscale commercial fowl operations even though the ordinance allows for the
maintenance of the same amount of fowl kept for personal use.77 Likewise,
DQRUGLQDQFHPD\UHVWULFWEXVLQHVVRZQHUV¶GLVSOD\V of temporary and porta72. Kirkham v. City of N. Little Rock, 227 Ark. 789, 790±91, 301 S.W.2d 559, 560
(1957) (emphasis added).
73. See id. at 794±96, 301 S.W.2d at 562±63.
74. See id.
75. Craft v. City of Ft. Smith, 335 Ark. 417, 425, 984 S.W.2d 22, 26 (1998).
76. See id. at 425, 984 S.W.2d at 27; see also Phillips v. Town of Oak Grove, 333 Ark.
183, 195, 968 S.W.2d 600, 606 (1998) (³The issue is not whether the legislation allows difference in treatment of activities generally similar in character, but whether there is a rational
basis for the difference.´).
77. See Phillips, 333 Ark. at 195, 968 S.W.2d at 605.
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EOH VLJQV RQ WKHLU SUHPLVHV WR RQO\ ³WZR QRQFRQVHFXWLYH SHULRGV XS WR 
GD\V HDFK GXULQJ DQ\ FDOHQGDU \HDU´ ZLWKRXW LPSRVLQJ WKH VDPH Uestrictions on residential landowners.78 An ordinance may also prohibit business owners from operating large trucks on a main road in coming to and
going from their places of business, but allow individuals to do so when
coming to and going from their residences.79 $EXVLQHVV¶VORFDWLRQPD\DOVR
play a substantial role in the basis for the distinction.80 Thus, a municipality
may enact ordinances that prohibit livery stables from operating within certain areas of the city but not sale stables81 or that impose anti-smoking reguODWLRQVRQEXVLQHVVHVWKDWDUHORFDWHG³LQKLJKO\YLVLEOHDUHDV´82 A municipality is allowed to use its police power for these purposes even if the municipality could have accomplished its objective through the use of less restrictive regulatory measures.83 Thus, under the current law in Arkansas, a
small business owner has little chance of successfully challenging an ordinance that classifies his or her business in an unfair manner.
Small businesses in Arkansas may face a similar instance of unequal
treatment when municipal police power is used to exclude certain businesses
from operating within a municipality. Under its police power, a municipality
in Arkansas may prohibit a previously lawful business activity.84 This power
may prohibit a business activity that is neither a current threat nor nuisance
to the community, as long as its activities pose a risk of future harm to the
public health, safety, and welfare.85 As a direct result of this prohibition, a
small business may be effectively excluded from operating its business
within a municipality.86 Although courts in Arkansas had previously stated
WKDW³DEXVLQHVVODZIXOLQLWVHOIDQGQRWDQXLVDQFHSHUVHPD\EHUHJXODWHG
EXWQRWSURKLELWHG´WKH$UNDQVDV6XSUHPH&RXUWGHFODUHGLQPhillips that it
had not applied the rule strictly.87 Citing the holding from Pierce Oil
78. See City of Hot Springs v. Carter, 310 Ark. 405, 406, 836 S.W.2d 863, 864 (1992).
79. See House v. City of Texarkana, 225 Ark. 162, 279 S.W.2d 831 (1955).
80. See Craft, 335 Ark. at 417, 984 S.W.2d at 22.
81. See Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 155 S.W. 105 (1913) aff¶d, 237 U.S. 171, 172±
78 (1915).
82. See Op. Ark. Att¶y. Gen. No. 129 (2005).
83. See Phillips v. Town of Oak Grove, 333 Ark. 183, 195, 968 S.W.2d 600, 606 (1998).
84. See id. at 191±93, 968 S.W.2d 600, 604±05.
85. See id. at 191, 968 S.W.2d at 604 (³[M]ere possibility of a public harm is sufficient
basis for the municipality to regulate under its police power.´).
86. See id.
87. Id. at 193, 968 S.W.2d at 605. Justice Glaze strongly disagreed with the court¶s
analysis of Arkansas case law. In his dissent, Justice Glaze argued that the court incorrectly
concluded it had not applied the rule strictly because it had ³always analyzed ordinances that
purport to prohibit lawful businesses under rational-basis review.´ See id. at 199, 968 S.W.2d
at 608 (Glaze, J., dissenting). According to Justice Glaze, the cases the court cited in support
of its contention were distinguishable from the instant case: In City of Morrilton, the court
held that municipal police power only included ³the right to regulate reasonably . . . [not] the
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Corp.,88 the court held that such ordinances were to be analyzed under a
rational-basis standard of review.89 7KXVXQGHUWKHFRXUW¶VUXOLQJLQPhillips,
a small business owner has little chance of successfully challenging an ordinance that prohibits an activity specific to his or her business, even if the
ordinance effectively excludes the business from operating within the municipality.90
C. Municipal Police Power Can Cause Severe Economic Consequences for
Small Businesses
An obvious adverse effect of municipal police power is the severe economic consequences small businesses may experience following the enactment of an ordinance. One type of economic consequence is the complete
shutdown of the business, which occurs when an ordinance has prohibited a
business activity that LV FHQWUDO WR WKH EXVLQHVV¶V RSHUDWLRQV 7KLV VFHQDULR
occurred in Reinman,91 Pierce Oil Corp.,92 and Phillips.93 A similar circumstance can occur when an individual incurs expenses in preparation for a
business, only to learn afterwards that a central activity associated with the
business is prohibited by ordinance.94 Fortunately, it appears that this scenario does not occur regularly in Arkansas, as evidenced by the relative dearth
of case law on the subject.95 Another type of economic consequence occurs
when the business is forced to expend money to comply with an ordinance.
Unlike large corporations, small businesses are often in a position where
they lack the financial resources to comply easily with newly enacted ordipower to prohibit . . . [a business] from conducting its lawful business´; in Piggott State Bank
v. State Banking Board, 242 Ark. 828, 416 S.W.2d 291 (1967), the power to prohibit was
specifically supported by statute; in Goldman & Co., the ordinance the court upheld ³did not
go as far as the one´ in the instance case. See id.
88. See id. at 192, 968 S.W.2d at 605. (³Under our holding in Pierce Oil Corp., a lawful
business that poses the possibility of harm can be regulated, even if the effect of the ordinance excludes the operation of the business within the city limits.´).
89. See Phillips, 333 Ark. at 194, 968 S.W.2d at 606. (³[O]ur decisions have made . . .
clear our application of the rational-basis test to ordinances that purport to prohibit lawful
businesses under the police power.´).
90. See id.
91. See City of Little Rock v. Reinman, 107 Ark. 174, 155 S.W. 105 (1913), aff¶d, 237
U.S. 171, 172±78 (1915).
92. See Pierce Oil Corp v. City of Hope, 127 Ark. 38, 191 S.W. 405 (1917), aff¶d, 248
U.S. 498 (1919).
93. See Phillips v. Town of Oak Grove, 333 Ark. 183, 968 S.W.2d 600 (1998).
94. See Goldman & Co. v. City of N. Little Rock, 220 Ark. 792, 792±94, 249 S.W.2d
961, 961±63 (1952) (Individual who worked in the waste paper industry purchased two buildings in North Little Rock with intent of storing waste paper only to find out that city¶s ordinance prohibited this business activity.).
95. Of course, the lack of case law on the subject may indicate that small business owners who face such a situation typically choose not to waste their resources litigating this issue.
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nances. Thus, compliance costs may substDQWLDOO\H[KDXVWDVPDOOEXVLQHVV¶V
financial resources.
A substantial loss in business is another type of economic consequence
that small businesses may experience following the enactment of an ordinance. An ordinance may fundamentally alter the character of a business,
resulting in a significant loss of clientele. Examples of regulations that affect
the character of a small business include anti-smoking regulations in restaurants96 and prohibitions against private clubs serving mixed-drinks between
2:00 am and 10:00 am.97 A small business also may lose business when an
ordinance affects its methods of advertising. Examples of these type of regulations includes a prohibition against blinking and flashing signs,98 a restriction against the continual display of temporary or portable signs,99 and a
mandatory removal of all commercial signs that fail to meet size, height, and
setback requirements.100 These types of regulations make it more difficult
for small businesses to attract new customers.
Municipalities are not required to compensate small business owners
who experience severe economic consequences following the enactment of
an ordinance owing to the nature of police power.101 As a result, small business owners facing one of the three scenarios described above are effectively punished even if they had previously complied with all federal, state, and
local laws.
IV.

ARGUMENT

Although municipal police power is essential for the long-term survival
of a community, the problems above illustrate that the power can adversely
affect small businesses in a number of ways. Accordingly, Arkansas courts
should consider adopting judicial measures that are more favorable to small
EXVLQHVVRZQHUVWKDQWKHFRXUW¶VFXUUHQWUDWLRQDO-basis review standard. By
doing so, courts in ArkanVDVZRXOGEHDGYDQFLQJWKHVWDWH¶VLQWHUHVWLQSUomoting small business development. This suggestion is in line with Justice
*OD]H¶VGLVVHQWLQPhillipsLQZKLFKKHVWDWHVWKDW³PXQLFLSDOUHJXODWLRQRI
industries, businesses, trades, and occupations . . . is limited by public policy
96. See Op. Ark. Att¶y. Gen. No. 129 (2005) (Restaurant owner estimated a 10% loss in
business due to new anti-smoking ordinances.). Such an ordinance is now moot in light of the
State¶s passage of indoor anti-smoking legislation.
97. See Tompos v. City of Fayetteville, 280 Ark. 435, 436, 658 S.W.2d 404, 405 (1983).
98. See City of Fayetteville v. S & H, Inc., 261 Ark. 148, 150, 547 S.W.2d 94, 95
(1977).
99. See City of Hot Springs v. Carter, 310 Ark. 405, 406, 836 S.W.2d 863, 863±64
(1992).
100. See City of Fayetteville v. McIlroy Bank & Trust Co., 278 Ark. 500, 501, 647
S.W.2d 439, 439 (1983).
101. MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, § 24:6.
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WRSURPRWHWKHJURZWKRIFRPPHUFHDQGLQGXVWU\´102 This section will identify several judicial and legislative measures, explain how they benefit small
businesses, weigh their positive and negative aspects, and discuss whether
courts in Arkansas should consider adopting one of them.
A.

Presumption Against Total Exclusions of Lawful Business Activities

A presumption against ordinances that totally exclude lawful business
activities would offer immense protection to small businesses in Arkansas.
In Pennsylvania, courts have carved out an exception to the general rule that
ordinances are presumptively valid.103 :KHUH DQ RUGLQDQFH H[FOXGHV ³DQ
RWKHUZLVH OHJLWLPDWH EXVLQHVV DFWLYLW\´ FRXUWV LQ 3HQQV\OYDQLD ZLOO UHJDUG
the ordinance as an unconstitutional act.104 Accordingly, the ordinance loses
its presumption of validity, and the municipality bears the burden of demonstrating that the exclusion was justified.105 This presumption does not extend
WR XVHV WKDW ZRXOG SRVH ³FOHDUO\ GHOHWHULRXV Hffects upon the general pubOLF´106 No court outside of Pennsylvania has adopted this approach, however.107
The Pennsylvania approach clearly is more favorable to small businesses than municipalities. As long as a small business can demonstrate that
municipal police power has been used to exclude a lawful business activity,
the small business does not have to prove that the municipality acted arbitrarily and capriciously. This means the ordinances prohibiting several of the
lawful business activities discussed earlier²heavy trucks, flashing signs,
and small-scale commercial fowl operations²would have had a much better
chance of being invalidated by the court. In addition, the Pennsylvania approach has the benefit of preventing nearby municipalities from adopting

102. Phillips v. Town of Oak Grove, 333 Ark. 183, 200, 968 S.W.2d 600, 608 (1998)
(Glaze, J., dissenting).
103. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 5.37 (LexisNexis 2003) (quoting
Beaver Gas Co. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Borough of Osborne, 285 A.2d 501, 504 (Pa.
1971)).
104. See id.
105. See id.; Jeffrey M. Lehmann, Reversing Judicial Deference Toward Exclusionary
Zoning: A Suggested Approach, 12 J. AFFORD. HOUS. & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 229, 243 (2003)
(³[Municipality] must then bear the burden of demonstrating that the ordinance substantially
benefits the health, safety, and welfare of the community.´).
106. Beaver Gas Co. v. Zoning Hrg. Bd. of Borough of Osborne, 285 A.2d 501, 504 (Pa.
1971). The court lists several examples of such uses: ³[A]ctivit[ies] generally known to give
off noxious odors, disturb the tranquility of a large area by making loud noises, [or that] have
the obvious potential of poisoning the air or the water of the area.´ Id.
107. EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR. ET. AL., RATHKOPF¶S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING §
22:5 (4th ed. 2012).
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similar prohibitions against undesirable business activities;108 a municipality
is less likely to adopt such an ordinance when it would bear an elevated burden of proof in court.109 Undoubtedly, the adoption of the Pennsylvania approach by courts in Arkansas ZRXOGVXEVWDQWLDOO\SURPRWHWKH6WDWH¶VLQWHrest in small business development.
6HYHUDO IDFWRUV ZHLJK KHDYLO\ DJDLQVW WKH 3HQQV\OYDQLD DSSURDFK¶V
adoption in Arkansas, however. First, no other state has adopted such an
approach.110 Second, under some circumstances, it may be necessary for a
municipality to use its police powers to exclude a lawful business activity. 111
To hold categorically that all ordinances that prohibit a lawful business activity are invalid undermines municipal police power. Finally, because this
approach focuses solely on the use rather than the individual, a wide variety
of individuals would be able to contest an ordinance prohibiting a lawful
business activity. Aside from having a possible chilling effect on a municiSDOLW\¶V DELOLW\ WR Xse its police powers, this approach opens the door to
large, sophisticated entities seeking to have such an ordinance overturned
for reasons unrelated to those discussed in Section III of this note. For these
reasons, a presumption against ordinances that totally exclude a lawful business activity may not be the best method of protection for small businesses
against burdensome ordinances.
B.

Use Variances

A use variance is a land use device that could potentially provide better
protection to adversely affected small businesses in Arkansas. Landowners
seek use variances from boards of zoning adjustment for uses that are prohibited by ordinances.112 As with the majority of states, Arkansas permits a
variance to be granted only in instances ³ZKHUH VWULFW HQIRUFHPent of the
ordinance would cause undue hardship due to circumstances unique to the
LQGLYLGXDOSURSHUW\XQGHUFRQVLGHUDWLRQ´113 By granting a landowner a use
variance, the board of zoning adjustment permits the landowner to continue
the prohibited use without having to challenge or amend the ordinance.114
108. See id. (discussing the Pennsylvania Supreme Court¶s analysis in Exton Quarries,
Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of W. Whiteland Twp., 425 Pa. 43, 59±60, 228 A.2d 169,
179 (1967)).
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, § 24:8.
112. See MANDELKER, supra note 103, § 6.42.
113. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-416(b)(2)(B)(i)(a) (Repl. 1998). See also David W. Owens, The Zoning Variance: Reappraisal and Recommendations for Reform of A MuchMaligned Tool, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 279, 287 (2004) (describing how a majority of states
use the same type of language in their enabling statutes).
114. See ZIEGLER, ET. AL, supra note 107, § 58:1.
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However, under current Arkansas law, boards of zoning adjustment are prohibited from granting use variances to landowners;115 they are limited to
granting only area variances.116 In contrast, the majority of states provide for
use variances in their enabling statutes.117
Small business owners would have a more suitable avenue for pursuing
relief against burdensome ordinances if the Arkansas legislature modified its
enabling statute to permit use variances. A clear benefit is a potential reduction in the expenses generated in challenging an ordinance. A small business
owner who met the hardship requirements would not have to resort to timeconsuming and expensive judicial action to obtain relief; he or she would
receive a variance for the contested use, and the ordinance would remain in
place.118 Small businesses that began operating after an ordinance was already in place might benefit from use variances as well.119 Under current
Arkansas law, a business activity that an ordinance prohibits is regarded as a
prohibited use and is not entitled to the same protections as a nonconforming use.120 For a small business to maintain the business activity it
must demonstrate that the ordinance itself is unconstitutional; this is extremely difficult to demonstrate. To receive a use variance, however, a small
business would only have to prove the existence of a hardship, which is a far
less exacting burden.121 A final benefit for small businesses seeking relief is
that boards of zoning adjustment are recognized as quasi-judicial bodies in
Arkansas.122 $ ODQGRZQHU ZKR LV XQVDWLVILHG ZLWK WKH ERDUG¶V GHQLDO RI D
variance is entitled to appeal the denial to a circuit court under a de novo
standard of review.123 Accordingly, the court will not give as great a level of
115. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-416(b)(2)(B)(i)(b) (Repl. 1998) (³The board shall not
permit, as a variance, any use in a zone that is not permitted under the ordinance.´).
116. An area variance is typically defined as a variance that ³modifies site development
requirements for permitted uses, such as lot size, yard, setback, and frontage restrictions[;][it
does not] change a prohibited use.´ MANDELKER, supra note 103, § 6.42.
117. See MANDELKER, supra note 103, § 6.43.
118. See Owens, supra note 113, at 317 (explaining that the ³possibility of granting expeditious administrative relief without the necessity of judicial action´ is a reason why zoning
variances should be retained).
119. See Phillips v. Town of Oak Grove, 333 Ark. 183, 968 S.W.2d 600 (1998).
120. In City of Harrison v. Wilson, 248 Ark. 736, 737, 453 S.W.2d 730, 731 (1970), the
Arkansas Supreme Court defined a non-conforming use as a ³lawful use that existed when
the zoning ordinance was adopted and that is permitted by the ordinance to continue.´ Because of its lawful status, a landowner is entitled to maintain the non-conforming use unless
the use is abandoned or destroyed, or a municipality enacts an amortization period for the
use. See WRIGHT, supra note 34, at 17±18.
121. See infra text accompanying note 125.
122. See Bridges, supra note 50, at 30 (explaining how the ³Arkansas Supreme Court has
recognized the quasi-judicial nature of variances,´ and that appeals are subject to a de novo
standard of review in a trial court.).
123. See id.
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deference to the board as it would to a municipality under the rational-basis
standard reserved for legislative actions.124 A small business, therefore,
would have a slightly better chance of prevailing in this form of judicial
proceeding.
The benefits offered by use variances must, however, be balanced
against their limitations. Because of the manner in which boards of adjustment are supposed to construe the hardship requirement, even if use variances were allowed in Arkansas, it is possible that few small businesses
would meet the requirement.125 For instance, a small business that began its
operations without obtaining a use variance beforehand might not satisfy the
hardship requirement.126 The fact that few small businesses would be permitted to maintain their prohibited uses suggests that use variances would not
VXEVWDQWLDOO\SURPRWHWKH6WDWH¶VLQWHUHVWLQVPDOOEXVLQHVVGHYHORSPHQW´,Q
addition, although landowners are entitled to a de novo standard of appeal in
a circuit court, a court PD\XSKROGWKHERDUG¶VGHQLDO³WRLPSOHPHQWWKHMuGLFLDO SROLF\ WKDW YDULDQFHV VKRXOG EH JUDQWHG µVSDULQJO\¶´127 Finally, use
variances are strongly disfavored by land use law academics, lawyers, and
professionals.128 For these reasons, use variances may not be the best method
for assisting adversely affected small businesses in Arkansas.
C.

$6XEVWDQWLDO'HFOLQHLQ5HDO3URSHUW\9DOXHDVDQ$XWRPDWLF³7DkLQJ´

During the Arkansas Spring 2013 Legislative Session, legislators proposed Senate Bill 367²entitled ³$Q $FWWR $GGUHVVWKH 3URWHFWLRQ RI 3UiYDWH 3URSHUW\´²as a possible method of resolving conflicts created by a

124. See id. at 35±36 (referring to the standard of review for quasi-judicial bodies as a
³zero-deference standard of review´).
125. A hardship typically must result from the physical condition of the land. See
WRIGHT, supra note 34, at 19 (stating that a valid hardship occurs when ³the landowner can
demonstrate that the peculiar shape of his lot, topographical conditions, subsurface problems
or the like render him unable to comply with the requirements of the ordinance´). But see
Owens, supra note 113, at 298±99 (discussing how in practice many boards of adjustment
routinely grant a petitioner¶s request for a variance without any regard to the level of hardship
presented).
126. Under such circumstances, a board of adjustment would likely find that the small
business owner¶s actions constitute a self-created hardship²a hardship that the landowner
created through his or her voluntary acts, as opposed to a hardship caused by restrictive zoning. Upon such a finding, the board is not supposed to grant the variance. See MANDELKER,
supra note 103, § 6.50; but see Owens, supra note 113, at 298±99.
127. See MANDELKER, supra note 103, § 6.52.
128. See generally Owens, supra note 113, at 320 (arguing that use variances are no
longer needed for effective land use planning, and that states should prohibit them in their
enabling statutes).
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PXQLFLSDOLW\¶V H[HUFLVH RI SROLFH SRZHU129 It passed the Arkansas Senate,
but ultimately failed to pass through the Arkansas House Judicial Committee in May 2013;130 it remains to be seen whether legislators will attempt to
pass the bill or a similar version in the next legislative session. In its most
recent form, the bill proposed to regard any local government regulatory
action causing a 25% decliQHLQDUHDOSURSHUW\RZQHU¶VIDLU-market value as
KDYLQJ EHHQ ³taken for the use of the public.´131 Any real property owner
who experienced such a loss would automatically be entitled to compensation from the municipality.132 As an alternative to compensation, the bill
would allow a municipality the option of not enforcing the regulatory action
against the adversely affected landowner.133 The bill broadly defined local
JRYHUQPHQWUHJXODWRU\DFWLRQDVHQFRPSDVVLQJ³DQ\UXOHUHJXODWLRQODZRU
ordinance that affHFWVWKHIDLUPDUNHWYDOXHRIUHDOSURSHUW\´DQGLQFOXGHG
specific examples of such actions.134 Although the bill created an exemption
IRUDPXQLFLSDOLW\¶VXVHRISROLFHSRZHUWRLPSURYHSXEOLFKHDOWKDQGVDIety,135 it appeared to allow recovery for losses caused by the use of municipal
police to improve the public welfare.136
The advantages that SB 367 affords to adversely affected small business owners are apparent. Small business owners would be entitled to automatic compensation from a municipality provided they could demonstrate a
129. See S.B. 367, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013). A similar bill was proposed during the 1995 session of the Arkansas General Assembly. For an excellent analysis
of that bill, see generally Morton Gitelman, Regulatory Takings and Property Rights in Arkansas, in ARKANSAS POLITICS: A READER 628 (Richard P. Wang & Michael B. Dougan eds.,
1997).
130. To Address the Protection of Private Property, ARKANSAS STATE LEGISLATURE,
http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2013/2013R/Pages/BillInformation.aspx?measureno=
SB367 (last visited Aug. 4, 2013).
131. See S.B. 367, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013).
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id. ³Compensation shall not be required under this subchapter if the regulatory
program is an exercise of the police power to prevent uses noxious or harmful to the health
and safety of the public.´ Although the bill defines ³noxious´ as a public nuisance, it does not
define ³harmful.´ Id. As discussed earlier, under Arkansas case law, the ³harmful´ element of
municipal police power encompasses a wide range of areas. Accordingly, a municipality
likely would continue to retain a great level of discretion to regulate in this area under the
Act.
136. The bill fails to include the phrase ³public welfare´ within its reference to police
power. Id. Indeed, the bill explicitly refers to ³aesthetic or scenic districts, environmental
districts, overlay districts, [and] green space ordinances´ in its definition of the types of regulatory programs subject to its provisions. Id. Given that Arkansas case law has held that the
³public welfare´ element of municipal police power encompasses aesthetics, the bill¶s explicit references to aesthetic land use ordinances suggest that a municipality¶s exercise of its
police power to improve the public welfare would be subject to the bill¶s provisions.
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GHFOLQHLQWKHLUSURSHUW\¶VIDLUPDUNHWYDOXH7KLVFULWHULRQLVQRWDKLJK
burden to satisfy; it is relatively easy to demonstrate a 25% decline in a real
SURSHUW\¶V IDLU-market value following the enactment of an ordinance.137
Thus, a small business owner who met that criterion would have no need to
ZDVWHPRQH\OLWLJDWLQJWKHOHJDOLW\RIDPXQLFLSDOLW\¶VH[HUFLVHRILWVSROLFH
power. The bill also benefits small business owners by allowing municipalities the option of not enforcLQJWKHRUGLQDQFHDJDLQVWDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VODQG,Q
this respect, the bill offers a benefit reminiscent of a use variance. Finally,
the bill would apply to regulatory actions only when they were actually apSOLHG WR D ODQGRZQHU¶V UHDO SURSHUW\ 7KXV D VPDOO business owner whose
business was substantially harmed when a municipality enforced a preexisting ordinance against him or her²like the Plaintiff in Phillips²would
be entitled to relief, despite his or her having engaged in a prohibited use.
7KHELOO¶VGisadvantages, however, outweigh the advantages it offers to
VPDOO EXVLQHVV RZQHUV %HFDXVH WKH ELOO H[HPSWV D PXQLFLSDOLW\¶V XVH RI
police power to improve public health and safety from its provisions, many
small business owners who experienced substantial losses as a direct result
of municipal police power would be denied relief. Only those small business
owners who were adversely affected by an ordinance enacted pursuant to an
aesthetic program would be entitled to aid. As discussed in sections B.1 and
B.2 of this note, such a group is not representative of the small business
owners typically affected by municipal police power. The bills most significant disadvantage, however, is its potential to severely constrain the ability
of local governments to use their regulatory power. Because the bill allows
any real property owner to seek compensation, and sets a relatively low burGHQIRUGHPRQVWUDWLQJD³WDNLQJ´ PXQLFLSDOLWLHVOLNHO\ZRXOGULVNORVLQJD
substantial amount of money in either awarding compensation or defending
themselves in lawsuits.138 Although the bill allows a municipality the option
of not enforcing the ordinance against the landowner, this option²like a use
variance²ZRXOGXQGHUPLQHDPXQLFLSDOLW\¶VDELOLW\WRHIIHFWLYHO\VWUXFWXUH
and organize its community.139 As a consequence of either one of these options, the bill likely would have a chilling effect on municipal regulation.140
)LQDOO\ WKH ELOO¶V EURDG GHILQLWLRQ RI UHJXODWRU\ DFWLRQ ULVNV LQYDOLGDWLQJ D
number of ordinances enacted pursuant to federal or state law rather than
137. See Morton Gitelman, Regulatory Takings and Property Rights in Arkansas, in
ARKANSAS POLITICS: A READER 628, 656±57 (Richard P. Wang & Michael B. Dougan eds.,
1997) (³For example, an acre of undeveloped land might be worth $20,000 for residential use
and $50,000 for commercial use. If the land is currently zoned agricultural and the city decides to rezone the area for residential uses, could the landowner claim a reduction in value of
$30,000?´).
138. See id. at 654±60.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 659.
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municipal police power.141 7KXV WKH ELOO VHYHUHO\ FXUWDLOV D PXQLFLSDOLW\¶V
power, while at the same time not fully resolving the conflicts created by
municipal police power. For these reasons, the approach proposed by SB
367 is probably not the best method to resolve this conflict.
D. Small Business Owners as a Protected Class
The recognition of small business owners as a protected class by courts
in Arkansas would offer small businesses greater protection from burdensome ordinances. Land use law commentators have argued that courts
should consider applying the Carolene Products IRRWQRWH¶VFULWHULDIRUSUesumption-shifting to land use cases.142 In the Carolene Products footnote,
WKH &RXUW LQGLFDWHG LW ZRXOG SURYLGH D ³PRUH VHDUFKLQJ MXGLFLDO LQTXLU\´
ZKHQ³SUHMXGLFHDJDLQVWµGLVFUHWHDQGLQVXODU¶PLQRULWLHVWHQGVVHULRXVO\
to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied
XSRQ WR SURWHFW PLQRULWLHV´143 Bruce Burton, a law professor, has argued
that small business owners should qualify as a protected class under the
Carolene Products IRRWQRWH¶VFULWHULD144 Accordingly, Burton argues that in
cases of an alleged regulatory taking, an adversely affected landowner who
can demonstrate that he or she is a small business owner, has experienced
losses for a period longer than six months, and has suffered non-incidental
damages should be entitled to have the burden of proof shift to the governmental agency to demonstrate that its actions were constitutional.145 This
note argues for a similar approach but within the context of municipal police
power.
Under such a revised approach, a small business owner who could
demonstrate that he or she has experienced substantial business losses either
as a direct or indirect result of an ordinance enacted pursuant to municipal
police power would be entitled to have the burden of proof shift to the municipality to demonstrate that its exercise of police power was justified. The
municipality would have an opportunity to rebut the facts asserted by the
small business owner or to assert that it acted to curtail an activity deleteri141. See Memorandum from Karla M. Burnett, Pulaski Cnty. Att¶y, to Buddy Villines,
Cnty Judge/CEO (Mar. 6, 2013), available at http://posting.arktimes.com/images/blog
images/2013/03/06/1362623189-sb367.pdf.
142. See Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Presumption of Constitutionality in Land-Use Law, 24 URB. LAW. 1, 3 (1992).
143. See id. (quoting United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4
(1938)).
144. See Bruce W. Burton, Predatory Municipal Zoning Practices: Changing the Presumption of Constitutionality in the Wake of the ³Takings Trilogy´, 44 ARK. L. REV. 65,
114±15 (1991) ([S]mall [business] owners may constitute ³discreet and insular minorities´ . .
. in special need of judicial recognition under footnote four of Carolene Products.´).
145. See id. at 117±19.
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ous to the public health, safety, and welfare.146 In addition, the municipality
could argue that its actions did not cause any economic harm to the small
business owner or that the small business owner has other viable business
uses remaining.147 If the municipality is unable to meet its burden of proof, it
will have to compensate the small business owner for any losses incurred as
a result of the contested ordinance.148
Several factors indicate that a more stringent form of rational-basis review should be the appropriate standard of review under this analysis. First,
this standard has been applied to a land use case involving a non-racially
suspect class, namely by the Supreme Court of the United States in City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Incorporated.149 Second, this standard
ZRXOGQRWVXEVWDQWLDOO\UHVWULFWDPXQLFLSDOLW\¶VXVHRILWVSROLFHSRZHU,nstead, the municipality would have to offer a justification for its exercise of
the power beyond the fact that it bore a reasonable relation to the public
health, safety, and welfare.150 Finally, commentators have suggested that a
heightened level of scrutiny is not applicable outside of a rights analysis,
which is difficult to develop in a land use case.151
The primary benefit of the protected-class approach lies in its balancing
RI WKH SDUWLHV¶ UHVSHFWLYH LQWHUHVWV 7KH DGYDQWDJHV DIIRUGHG WR VPDOO EXViness owners are evident: small business owners are presented with a better
opportunity of obtaining relief from a burdensome ordinance. The small
business owner would not have to initially attack the ordinance as an arbitrary and capricious decision, or maintain a pre-enforcement challenge
against the ordLQDQFH¶VYDJXHQHVV,QDGGLWLRQWKLVDSSURDFKZRXOGDSSO\WR
all types of municipal police power, unlike SB 367, which focused on the
public welfare element alone. Finally, this approach would allow all small
business owners who met the criteria to seek relief; the fact that a small
business owner either engaged in a business use that was prohibited by a
previously unenforced ordinance or was indirectly harmed by an ordinance
would not bar him or her from seeking relief.

146. See id.; Beaver Gas Co. v. Zoning Hrg. Bd. of Borough of Osborne, 285 A.2d 501,
504 (Pa. 1971).
147. Bruce W. Burton, Predatory Municipal Zoning Practices: Changing the Presumption of Constitutionality in the Wake of the ³Takings Trilogy´, 44 ARK. L. REV. 65, 117±19
(1991).
148. See id.
149. See Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 142, at 13±14.
150. For instance, a municipality could demonstrate that it conducted detailed studies that
indicated the use of police power was necessary to resolve the issue.
151. Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Two Cheers for Shifting the Presumption of
Validity: A Reply to Professor Hopperton, 24 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 103, 110 (1996)
(³Heightened judicial scrutiny is ultimately grounded in constitutional concerns, and thus
works best with a rights analysis . . . [;]it is difficult to develop a rights analysis for zoning.´).
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The advantages afforded to municipalities are less obvious, but substantial nonetheless. Unlike the Pennsylvania approach, the protected class
approach gives greater deference to the municipality. Instead of presuming
that all ordinances that exclude lawful business activities are unconstitutional, this approach would give the municipality an opportunity to justify its
decision with one or all of the defenses mentioned above. Similarly, this
approach would avoid the harsh results proposed by SB 367 by restricting
the class of plaintiffs to small business owners only and not allowing small
business owners to prevail based solely on their having suffered a statutorily
determined amount of damage. Further, by limiting relief to compensation
only, this approach would not greatly undermine the ability of municipalities
to structure and organize their communities through ordinances. Indeed, this
approach could benefit municipalities by showing them how to better use
their police powers; if a municipality is unable to justify its actions at court,
the experience teaches it that it needs to act more prudently before exercising its police powers in the future.152
The primary disadvantage of the protected class approach is that no jurisdiction has adopted an approach similar to it. As such, it is uncertain exactly how courts in Arkansas would utilize such an approach. Still, this factor alone should not dissuade courts in Arkansas from adopting it. The advantages afforded to small business owners under this approach would proPRWH WKH VWDWH¶V LQWHUHVW LQ VPDll business development. Likewise, this approach would restrain municipal police power from being exercised to the
detriment of commerce and industry, which, according to Justice Glaze,
VKRXOG EH DQ DVSHFW RI $UNDQVDV¶s public policy.153 Finally, the approach
reaches a better result for small businesses and municipalities than that proposed by the Arkansas Legislature in SB 367. For the foregoing reasons, the
protected class approach may be the best method by which courts in Arkansas could protect small businesses from burdensome ordinances.
V.

CONCLUSION

0XQLFLSDOSROLFHSRZHUEHQHILWVDFRPPXQLW\E\EHLQJDEOHWR³PHHW
changing conditions that call for revised or new regulations to promote the
SXEOLFKHDOWKVDIHW\PRUDOVRUZHOIDUH´154 For the most part, a municipality exercises its police power with proper discretion to benefit the public.
Yet, as has been demonstrated throughout this note, municipal police power
can adversely affect small businesses in a number of ways. Under the cur152. Id. at 111 ³The use of a presumption shift, imperfect as it is, can . . . ³teach´ local
governments how to [make land use decisions] correctly . ´).
153. See Phillips v. Town of Oak Grove, 333 Ark. 183, 199, 968 S.W.2d 600, 608 (1998)
(Glaze, J., dissenting).
154. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, § 24:8.
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rent law in Arkansas, small businesses that are adversely affected by ordinances have little opportunity for redress in the courtroom. To improve this
situation, courts in Arkansas should consider adopting a judicial approach
that regards small businesses as a protected class. This approach would afford small businesses greater protection from burdensome ordinances, while
at the same time respecting the interests of municipalities in promoting the
public health, safety, and welfare of the community. Thus, by adopting this
approDFK FRXUWV LQ $UNDQVDV ZRXOG SURPRWH WKH 6WDWH¶V LQWHUHVW LQ VPDOO
business development.
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